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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Based on evidence discovered during the unjustified extension of his detention following
a  completed  DUI  investigation,  Ronaldo  Dean  Islas  entered  conditional  pleas  of  guilty  to
possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia, reserving his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Mr. Islas was stopped by a police officer for a traffic violation and investigated for DUI.
After the officer determined Mr. Islas was not under the influence, and lacking any particularized
suspicion of crime, the officer continued the detention so that he could examine pieces of glass
that had fallen from Mr. Islas’s lap.  When the officer recognized the pieces as potentially
fragments of a methamphetamine pipe, he searched Mr. Islas pockets, and, finding marijuana,
arrested him.
The district court denied the motion, based, in part, on its finding that there was “an
extremely  minimal  amount  of  time”  between  the  completion  of  the  DUI  investigation  and  the
determination that there may be methamphetamine.  And, although the State conceded that the
subsequent search of Mr. Islas’s pockets was not justified and required suppression, the district
court declined to suppress, or to even address those issues.
On appeal, Mr. Islas asserts the district court erred in concluding that the unjustified
extension  of  Mr.  Islas’s  detention,  even  if  extremely  minimal,  or  “de minimis,” violated his
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures.  Additionally, he asserts the district
court erred in failing to order suppression of all the evidence discovered as the direct or indirect
result of the unlawful search of Mr. Islas’s pockets.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing.1  On July 3, 2016,
Kootenai County Sheriff’s Officer Joshua Leyk observed Mr. Isalas’s Dodge Stratus pulling out
from a parking lot and onto the roadway, and then drive “for a moment or two” before turning on
its headlamps.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-19.)2  It was 9:02 p.m., and Officer Leyk had previously
confirmed with dispatch that official sunset time was 8:48 p.m.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-19; Vol.2
Tr., p.5, Ls.13-20.)  Officer Leyk decided to stop the vehicle for driving after sunset without
headlights, in violation of I.C. § 49-903. (Vol.1 Tr., p.6, Ls.22-23; Vol.2 Tr., p.5, Ls.21-25.)  As
he approached the vehicle, Officer Leyk detected the odor of alcohol from the driver’s window,
and he noticed Mr. Islas’s eyes appeared glassy and bloodshot, and that Mr. Islas’s pants were
unzipped. (Vol.1 Tr., p.18, Ls.5-6; Vol.2 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-10.) (Vol. 2 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-14.)  Officer
Leyk also observed small  circular pieces of what appeared to be glass or plastic on Mr. Islas’s
lap (Vol.1 Tr., p.7, Ls.81-5; p.23, Ls.11-23; Vol.2 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-13), but he did not otherwise
know what these pieces were (Vol.1 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-15).  Officer Leyk ordered Mr. Islas to get
out of the car, and as Mr. Islas did so, Officer Leyk saw the pieces of glass fall from Mr. Islas’s
lap onto the ground.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-14; Vol.2 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-25.)  There was no evidence
offered at the hearing to indicate that at this time Officer Leyk actually suspected, or had a
1 At the suppression hearing, Officer Leyk was asked to review his Report and the video of the
encounter recorded on his body cam, in order to refresh his recollection. (See Vol.1 Tr., p.17, L.4
– p.18, L.7 (reviews report); p.19, L.13 – p.22, L.4 (reviews video); p.22, Ls.8-10 (reviews
video)).  However, neither the Report nor the video was offered as evidence (see generally,
Vol.1 Tr., pp.4-47), and neither appears to have been considered as evidence by the district court
in ruling on the suppression motion (Vol.2 Tr., pp.4-9).  State’s Exhibit A, the only exhibit
offered, is a photo of one of the glass pieces.  (See Exhibit A.)
2 The transcripts are contained in three volumes, designated as “Vol.1 Tr.,” etc.  Volume 1
contains the transcript of the suppression hearing, held 1/12/17; Volume 2 contains the transcript
of the district court’s decision on the motion to suppress, on 1/24/17, and the change of plea
hearing on 3/10/17.  Volume 3 contains the transcript of the sentencing hearing, held 5/19/2017.
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reason to suspect, that the pieces were connected to criminal activity.  (See generally, Vol.1,
Tr., pp.5-36.)  Officer Leyk directed Mr. Islas to stand at the back of Mr. Islas’s vehicle, on the
rear passenger side, where the officer conducted his DUI investigation, including questioning
and field testing; upon completing the testing, Officer Leyk determined Mr. Islas was not under
the influence and ended his DUI investigation.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.8, L.19 – p.20, L.2; Vol.2 Tr., p.7,
Ls.1-6.)
However, although Officer Leyk had clearly ended his investigation, he did not indicate
to  Mr.  Islas  that  he  was  free  to  go.   (Vol.1,  Tr.,  p.24,  Ls.11-13.)   On the  contrary,  the  officer
instructed  Mr.  Islas  to,  “Have  a  seat  on  the  back  of  your  vehicle.”   (Vol.1  Tr.,  p.24,  Ls.8-19.)
Officer Leyk then walked to the front driver’s side of the vehicle so that he could examine the
glass pieces that had fallen to the ground by the driver’s door.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.24, Ls.20-24; Vol.2
Tr., p.7, Ls.9-13.)  He noticed a thick coating of white and brownish crystal substance that, based
on his training and experience, was consistent with methamphetamine or methamphetamine
residue.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-22; Vol.2, p.7, Ls.9-11.)  At that point, Officer Leyk handcuffed
Mr. Islas and searched his person, finding marijuana inside of his pockets.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.24, L.23
– p.25, L.7.)  Officer Leyk told Mr. Islas he was under arrest for possession of marijuana. (Vol.1
Tr.,  p.25,  Ls.5-9.)   Officer  Leyk then  conducted  a  NIK test  of  the  substance  on  the  glass,  and
then he called for a drug dog; and after that, other contraband was found which tested
presumptive positive for methamphetamine.  (Vol.2 Tr., p.8, Ls.17-24.)
Based on the evidence discovered by the police during this encounter, the State charged
Mr. Islas with possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.26-27, 55.)
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Mr. Islas filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search violated
his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures secured by the Idaho and United States
constitutions.  (R., pp.56, 69-78.)  He argued that the initial stop was unreasonable and therefore
unlawful, and that the detention was unlawfully prolonged twice:  first when the officer ordered
him to step out of the car to conduct an investigation for DUI; and again when the officer ordered
him  to  sit  on  the  back  of  the  car  after  having  determined  he  was  not  under  the  influence  and
ending that investigation.  (R., p.73.)  He additionally challenged the lawfulness of the
warrantless search of his pockets, and his subsequent arrest and continued detention based on the
evidence found during that unlawful search.  (R., pp.76-77; Vol.1 Tr., p.43, Ls.17 – p.44, L.6.)
In its brief in opposition to the motion to suppress, the State conceded the search of
Mr. Islas’s pockets was unlawful and that the evidence – marijuana – found in them must be
suppressed.  (R., p.82.)  But the State made no argument regarding the unlawfulness of the
resulting arrest for possession of marijuana, or the lawfulness of Mr. Islas’s extended detention
that flowed from the illegal search and arrest.  (R., p.82; Vol.1 Tr., pp.37-40.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress.  (R., p.94.)  The district court held that
the initial traffic stop was justified based on the officer’s observation of Mr. Islas’s driving for
four to five seconds after sunset without his headlights on, in violation of I.C. § 49-903.  (Vol.2
Tr., p.5, Ls.15-23.)  The district court also held the officer was justified in extending the stop in
order  to  investigate  Mr.  Islas  for  DUI,  because  the  officer’s  observations  of  Mr.  Islas’s  glassy
and bloodshot eyes, and unzipped pants, along with his detection of an alcohol odor coming from
the car, provided reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Islas may have been driving under the
influence.  (Vol.2 Tr., p.6, L.5 – p.7, L.6.)
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Consistent with the undisputed testimony, the district court found that Officer Leyk’s
DUI investigation ended once he determined Mr. Islas was not under the influence.  (Vol.2
Tr., p.7, Ls.4-6.)
Addressing the reasonableness of the extended detention, the court specifically found that
Officer Leyk had no knowledge of any other facts linking Mr. Islas or his vehicle to drug
activity.  (Vol.2, Tr., p.8, Ls.12-15.)  Additionally, there was no evidence indicating that Officer
Leyk recognized any of the glass pieces as possible fragments of a meth pipe until after he had
completed the DUI investigation, and after he walked back to the driver’s side of the car to
examine the pieces on the ground.  (R., p.82; Vol.1 Tr., pp.37-40.)  Evidently aware that the
justification for Mr. Islas’s detention had ended with the completion of the DUI investigation, the
district court decided to deny the suppression based, in part, on the fact that there was an
“extremely minimal amount of time” between the end of the DUI investigation and the time the
officer walked to the glass and determined there may be methamphetamine.  (Vol.2 Tr., p.8,
Ls.12-24.)
Following the denial of his suppression motion, Mr. Islas entered conditional guilty pleas
to possession of a methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia,
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  (R., p.97; Vol.3
Tr., p.11, Ls.9-12.)  The court sentenced Mr. Islas to a suspended four-year term, with two years
fixed, and placed him on probation.  (R., pp.104-109.)  Mr. Islas timely appealed.  (R., p.110.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Islas’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Islas’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
Officer Leyk violated Mr. Islas’s Fourth Amendment rights when he extended his
detention of Mr. Islas without justification for doing so.  The district court recognized the basis
for prolonging the detention ended once the investigation was completed, and no new
justification  had  emerged  until  after  the  officer  had  examined  the  pieces  of  glass.   The  district
court found this extension to be “extremely minimal”; however, the United States Supreme Court
has made it clear that de minimis extensions are still Fourth Amendment Violations. See State v.
Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, fn. 2 (2016) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct.
1609, 1615-16 (2015). For this reason, the district court’s decision denying Mr. Islas’s
suppression motion should be reversed.
Additionally, the district court’s decision should be reversed because the court failed to
conclude that the officer unlawfully searched Mr. Islas’s pockets.  Mr. Islas claimed the officer
lacked probable cause to search his person; the State conceded the issue and agreed the
marijuana should be suppressed.  Mr. Islas asserts that all of the evidence discovered as the direct
and indirect result of that personal search should have been suppressed.  It was undisputed that
the search, and the direct discovery of the marijuana in Mr. Islas’s pockets, took place before the
officer tested the glass pieces for methamphetamine and before the officer called the drug canine
unit.  Given this record, the district court should have ordered suppression of the direct and
indirect fruits of that unlawful search; the court erred in failing to do so.
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B. Standard Of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a defendant’s motion to
suppress, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).  Factual findings that are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence are clearly erroneous. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659
(2007).  “Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting
evidence,  and  factual  inferences  to  be  drawn  are  also  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court.”
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 804.  However, this Court maintains free review over whether the facts
surrounding the search and seizure satisfy constitutional requirements. Henage, 143 Idaho at
658.
C. The District Court Erroneously Denied Mr. Islas’s Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The stop of a vehicle by law
enforcement constitutes a seizure of its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies.
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
Evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment protections is subject to the exclusionary
rule,  which  requires  the  suppression  of  both  primary  evidence  obtained  as  a  direct  result  of  an
illegal search or seizure, and evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality,
that is, “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85
(1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in
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criminal activity. State v. Aberasturi, 152 Idaho 517, 560  (Ct. App. 2017). An investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
detention, State v. Howell, 159 Idaho 245, 248 (Ct. App. 2015); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491,
500 (1983).  The authority for the seizure ends when tasks required to fulfill the purpose of the
detention are completed. Howell, at 248; Royer, at 500.  Police may not extend an otherwise-
completed traffic stop to conduct a different investigation, even briefly, absent reasonable
suspicion. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983).
The State has the burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of
reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the condition of an
investigative detention.  State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361-62 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983)) (emphasis added).  “The seizure remains lawful
only ‘so long as unrelated inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’”
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. at 1615, (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333
(2009)) (brackets omitted). While a brief period of time may reasonably be considered de
minimis, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that de minimis Fourth Amendment
violations are still unlawful. See State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, fn. 2 (2016) (citing
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615-16 (2015)).
1. The  District  Court  Erred  In  Failing  To  Conclude  That  The  Police’s  Unjustified
Extension Of Mr. Islas’s Detention, Even If De Minimis, Violated His
Constitutional Rigths
The district court erred in failing to conclude that the unjustified extension of Mr. Islas’s
detention, even if de minimis, violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
seizures.  Officer Leyk testified unequivocally that he had ended his DUI investigation and that
he  did  not  indicate  to  Mr.  Islas  that  he  was  free  to  go.   (Vol.1,  Tr.,  p.24,  Ls.11-13.)   To  the
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contrary, Officer Leyk continued to detain Mr. Islas, instructing him, “Have a seat on the back of
your vehicle.”  (Vol.1 Tr., p.24, Ls.8-19.)  Officer Leyk did not testify that at that point he
suspected Mr. Islas of any criminal activity, or that he had any idea of what the pieces of glass on
the ground might be.  (See generally, Vol.1 Tr., pp.5-36.)  To the contrary, Officer Leyk testified
that  when he  first  noticed  the  pieces  of  what  appeared  to  be  plastic  or  glass,  he  did  not  know
what  they  were.   (Vol.1  Tr.,  p.7,  Ls.13-15.)   He  testified  that  one  of  the  glass  pieces  “drew
special attention” but did not explain why that was, other than he hadn’t initially noticed it on
Mr. Islas’s lap.  (Vol.1 Tr., p.8, Ls.10-12.)  No evidence was presented at the suppression
hearing indicating that Officer Leyk suspected the glass pieces might be pieces of a meth pipe
until after he examined them, which was after he had completed his DUI investigation, and after
he told Mr. Islas to sit on the back of the car.  Additionally, as expressly found by the district
court, Officer Leyk “had no knowledge of any other facts linking Mr. Islas or his vehicle to drug
activity.”  (Vol.2, Tr., p.8, Ls.12-15.)
The district court acknowledged there was no justification for extending Mr. Islas’s
detention once the DUI investigation ended.  (Vol.2 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-14.)  However, declining to
find any violation of Mr. Islas’s rights, the district court explained it was denying the motion to
suppress based, in relevant part, on the fact that the unjustified extension of Mr. Islas’s detention
was “extremely minimal.”  (Vol.2 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-17.)
The  district  court’s  reasoning  is  erroneous  and  contradicts  Fourth  Amendment  law:
“While such a brief period of time [may] reasonably be considered de minimis, the United States
Supreme Court was clear in Rodriguez that de minimis exceptions are no longer available.”
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, fn. 2 (2016) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. _,
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135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615-16 (2015)).  In Rodriguez, the Court expressly rejected the de minimis rule
advanced by the government in that case, and which several federal circuits had adopted. Id.
Once Officer Leyt had completed the DUI investigation having determined that Mr. Islas
was not under the influence, the justification for the stop, along with the authority for the
detention, ended. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. at 1616.  Prolonging the detention
beyond that point was unlawful, even if de minimis, and violated Mr. Islas’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. The  district  court’s  contrary  conclusion  is  erroneous,  and  its  denial  of  Mr.  Islas’s
motion to suppress should be reversed.
2. The District Court Erred In Failing To Order Suppression Of All Evidence
Discovered As The Direct Or Indirect Result Of The Unlawful Search Mr. Islas’s
Pockets
The district court also erred in failing to order suppression of all evidence discovered as
the direct or indirect result of the unlawful warrantless search of Mr. Islas’s pockets.  “Searches
conducted without a warrant are considered per se unreasonable unless they fall into one of the
‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ to this general rule.” State v. Lee, 162
Idaho 642, 647 (2017).  Once a defendant has established that a warrantless search occurred, the
State bears the burden of establishing that a valid exception applies. State v. Armstrong, 158
Idaho 364, 370 (Ct. App. 2015).  “A search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable
cause with respect to that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
In his motion to suppress, Mr. Islas claimed the warrantless search of his pockets was
unlawful because it lacked probable cause, and he sought suppression of all “fruits” of that
unlawful search pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). (R., pp.56,
69-78.)  In its brief opposing the motion, the State conceded the personal search of Mr. Islas was
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unlawful and did not attempt to offer any justification for that search.  (R., p.82.)  The State also
agreed that the marijuana and paper found in Mr. Islas’s pockets must be suppressed.  (R., p.82.)
However,  and  notwithstanding  the  State’s  concession  or  its  failure  to  attempt  to  justify
the search,3 the district court declined to suppress that evidence.  (See generally, Vol.2 Tr., pp.4-
9.)  The failure to suppress was error and the denial of the motion must be reversed.
Additionally, Mr. Islas had argued that the unlawful search of his pockets and subsequent
discovery of marijuana tainted Officer Leyk’s subsequent actions and investigation, and
requiring suppression not only of the marijuana found in his pocket, but of all of the evidence in
this case, as the indirect “fruit” of the unlawful search.  (R., pp.76-77; Vol.1 Tr., p.43, Ls.17 –
p.44,  L.6.)   As  noted  above,  Officer  Leyk did  not  field  test  the  glass  pieces  or  call  the  canine
drug unit until after he had searched Mr. Islas’s pocket and found the marijuana.  (Vol.1
Tr., p.25, Ls.5-9; Vol.2 Tr., p.8, Ls.17-24.)  Thus, on remand, the district court should order
suppression of all of the evidence found as the fruit of that search.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Islas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of his
suppression motion, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of January, 2018.
___________/s/______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
3 The State offered no argument that Officer Leyk’s observation of the broken glass pieces, prior
to field testing them, provided him with probable cause to arrest Mr. Islas.  (See generally
R., p.82; Vol.1 Tr., pp.37-40.)
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